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Abstract  
The 'deficiency model' of aging has often been criticized for its lack of attention to 
the individual patient's narrative understanding of his own life. However, such 
narrative conceptions tend to focus on a generic adult person, situated in specific 
on-going projects and relationships, moving toward a more or less clear 
conception of the future. What interest me, on the other hand, are those 
individuals who have become aware of their own death as imminent, and who 
therefore strive to compose the 'last chapter' of their life story. Imminence is not 
to be taken in chronological or clinical terms, but as revealing an attitude to 
oneself and one's own life. The composition of the last chapter requires 
recollecting and reappraising the events of one's life in an effort to make sense of 
the life as a whole. I propose revising the ancient Greek word eudaemonia to 
capture this sense of achieving an integrated meaning to one's life. 
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The Last Chapter in the Story: A Place for Aristotle's  
Eudaemonia in the Lives of the Terminally Ill 
The goals of medicine in the face of biological aging should be, above all, to target 
those physical and mental conditions that tend to rob old age of human meaning and 
social significance. Medicine cannot create that meaning, which must come from 
individual reflection and social policy and practices. (Callahan 1994 p. 41) 
These are the words of Daniel Callahan. In this article, I am less interested in Callahan's 
proposed changes to social policy and practice, and more in the 'individual reflection' 
mentioned above; especially that type of reflection peculiar to the final stages of life. But 
understanding individual reflection properly will require a discussion of human meaning 
and social significance, and the role of such significance in the dying patient's reflection. 
Despite their enormous diversity of personalities and backgrounds, the elderly are all 
too often united in discussions about healthcare policy into a single class on the basis of 
biological ageing, sometimes called the 'deficiency model' (Schmid, 1991). Certain 
physiological functions decline in a given individual in predictable ways, and it will 
require resources to care, treat, and manage the decline as best as possible. Old age is 
a mirror image of infancy because of the return to physical vulnerability and 
dependency, and in some cases, to the same kind of incompetence. 
Such a classification, as heretofore described, is certainly understandable for a 
healthcare policy analyst or manager. In basing the classification on deficiency; 
however, I submit that the class implicitly includes other individuals with long-term 
deficiencies such as children and the handicapped. But the elderly are importantly 
different from these two other classes because they are at the end of their lives. Even if 
they are not able-bodied now, most of them have been in the past; but more than just 
able-bodied, they have lived rich lives full of projects and relationships. Obviously, any 
decent care of the elderly requires some interest in their biographies. However, such an 
interest is required for all patients whatever their age or prognosis. With the elderly, the 
individual's location in life, the fact that they are looking back on their biography, is just 
as important as the content of the biography. I want to suggest that this location, last 
chapter of the story," (Brody 2003 p. 254), is the source of the peculiar vulnerability to 
humiliation suffered by the elderly; especially in institutional healthcare. 
In explaining this, I shall make use of the ancient Greek concept of eudaemonia, which 
is all too often mistranslated as happiness. This elderly person is not just at the end of 
life, but at the end of his life, and he is therefore concerned to write the last chapter of 
the story of his life. As any book-reader knows, the last chapter is not merely the final 
series of events, but it wraps up the story, and may do so more or less satisfactorily. No 
matter how enjoyable the story might have been to read through chapter by chapter, it is 
possible to spoil a book by a bad ending. It is the last chapter, and the effort to write it, 
that best characterizes the elderly. 
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What do I mean by 'elderly', since of course "you're only as old as you feel"? The 
concept is necessarily vague, and has little to do with chronological age or medical 
prognosis: there is always room for hope, however slim, and there is always room for 
defiant self-deception. Instead, I have in mind those people who are aware at a suitably 
deep level that allows for no further self-deception that the end is nigh, and who are 
preparing themselves for it bravely and responsibly. How nigh is again impossible to 
define; but there will be a moment where the person realizes that it is simply time to 
start preparing for the inevitable. Such preparations are certainly compatible with 
continuing delight in one's day-to-day living, and with looking forward to events in the 
weeks and months to come; there need be no bitterness or defeatism in the 
preparations. This paper will explore the nature of such preparations, phrased in terms 
of writing the final chapter and seeking eudaemonia. I shall not be getting into thorny 
questions of when to withdraw treatment or when to make strenuous efforts to prolong 
life, although what I say will have clear implications for such a debate. 
EUDAEMONIA 
The concept of eudaemonia does not seem to have much currency in medical ethics 
today, let alone in modern philosophy. There is an English word 'happiness' into which 
the Greek word is widely translated, which has played a key role in the development of 
utilitarianism and which retains pride of place in the Declaration of Independence. But 
happiness is too thin and too vague to suffice as a translation, and it has unwelcome 
connotations of subjectivity, as can be seen in the vapid response: "Whatever makes 
you happy, dear." 
Sometimes eudaemonia is translated as 'flourishing', which is an improvement because 
it has a wider temporal scope, a greater engagement with objective facts about the 
quality of one's life, and a greater complexity than mere happiness 
(http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/aristotle-ethics). Nevertheless, it remains too 
limited to suffice as a full translation because it remains essentially occurrent. I am 
flourishing now, but there is no necessary reference to whether my life as a whole was 
flourishing. My present flourishing is compatible with an unexpected reversal of fortune, 
or with the discovery of facts that would radically undermine the value of my present 
commitments. It is this reference to one's life as a whole that is a key to understanding 
eudaemonia. Insofar as the future remains open, it is hard to tell how worthwhile the life 
as a whole will be. As such, eudaemonia is something that can only be acquired and 
observed at the end of a life, once the story has been written and all the pieces are in 
place. (Strictly speaking, a person's eudaemonia does not end entirely with his death. 
One's achievement as a parent, for example part of one's eudaemonia will be partly 
revealed by the behavior of one's offspring after one's death.) 
A closer translation at this point might be 'reputation', but on its own that is too 
pragmatic. A reputation is something that I seek to acquire as a means to doing other 
things, such as business. Eudaemonia cannot be so instrumental since the dead person 
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does not stand to benefit at all. But 'reputation' is partly correct in allowing the survival of 
the reputation beyond the death of its owner.  
I think the best translation is simply 'good life story'. It is the story that others will tell 
about me after I have gone, a story that accurately captures me as a person, as well as 
the projects and relationships to which I contributed and which partly constituted me as 
a person. It is a story with familiar requirements of coherence and integrity, and it is a 
story with clear chapters; the one emerging out of the preceding one, and leading 
toward a final chapter which wraps the story up satisfactorily.  
This narrative conception of life is hardly new. What is often neglected in narratives 
discussions, however, are the elderly person's specific location in the story and his 
relation to that story. I'm interested in that person's experience of looking back over his 
life, and in his efforts to make sense of it by writing the final chapter. 
NARRATIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The patient's narrative understanding of his illness, i.e. the way that the illness is 
experienced within the context of his on-going life, is now widely recognized as 
important to medical ethics (Charon &Montello 2002; Nelson, 1997). Let me recap 
something of the narratives critique of the conception of the self-presupposed by most 
debates in medical ethics. Liberalism tends to conceive all competent adults as a single 
class, and in many ways this is a good thing. A competent 98-year-old has exactly the 
same right to vote, marry and buy property as an 18-year-old; and in both cases it will 
be up to the state to justify any restrictions on such a right. As such, it doesn't matter, in 
the narrow sense that it is not the state's business to ask, who or what the person is. 
Strictly speaking, the person's biographical history, as well as his present commitments 
and plans for the future, are irrelevant to the individual rights which characterize his 
relations with the state, and by extension, with any large institution (such as healthcare 
facilities) regulated by the state. 
As has now been recognized by many, the combination of the thin liberal account and 
physiological deficiency model cannot adequately account for the more complicated 
lives of real people. There is no room for the individual's personal narrative as a source 
of integrity and identity as structuring the elderly patient's point of view on the world; 
including his point of view on any care and treatment he is being offered. Such integrity 
and identity also grounds the particular kind of dignity possessed by the elderly (in the 
sense of their particular vulnerability to humiliation), above and beyond the general 
dignity ascribed by liberalism to all human beings. 
The complicated lives of real people are lived in medias res (in the midst of things); they 
essentially find themselves in certain on-going narratively-structured projects and 
relationships, on their way from their past toward their conception of the future. Such 
projects and relationships will themselves derive part of their determinate meaning from 
the meta-narrative structures that define certain institutions and communities. So a 
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marriage between two people will best be conceived in terms of a narrative through 
time, and that narrative will itself make necessary reference to the narrative of marital 
traditions in that community.  
The past and the future in question provide much of the meaning to the individual's 
present options, dilemmas and choices. Most 'narratives' accounts, however, focus on 
the lives of generic adults, where the individual still has a future. There has been 
comparatively little discussion of how the deep awareness of inevitable death, for those 
who are so aware of it, radically changes one's attitude toward one's life: both the life 
experienced in the present and the life remembered from the past. 
The last chapter is about preparing for death; certainly about putting one's affairs in 
order, making a will, expressing gratitude and apologies, and saying goodbye. But the 
last chapter is also about recapitulating the events of one's life, and striving to make 
sense of them. I submit, this is much more than just recalling the event, and, say, taking 
pleasure in the recollection: it is more to do with trying to fit it into the life story by 
making use of the more objective perspective available at the end of the story. 
Consider the following narrative as an example. Let's say I met my future wife on a 
summer's day at the Edinburgh Theatre Festival in 1980. I then married her in 1985, 
and we both fondly remembered the first meeting in Edinburgh. Then things went 
wrong. I divorced her in 1990 and cursed that day in Edinburgh. Five years after the 
divorce, I come to think that we both tried our best to make the marriage work, but it 
was simply not to be. There were some good times and my memory of the Edinburgh 
meeting might now be described as bittersweet.  
Now throughout the period from 1980 to 1995, the facts of the matter have not changed, 
but the significance has. Facts can be corroborated: I can check the color of her dress 
from a photograph I still have, I can check the title of the performance we say on a 
particular date by looking through archives, and I can therefore correct my memory. In 
other words, my memories of the facts of an event are answerable to the truth. The 
precise significance of an event, on the other hand, will depend on my precise location 
in my life's journey, and on the context of that location, since I will be looking at the 
event from that location. 'Location' has a broad scope to include all my projects, 
relationships, concerns of that moment, as well as the route by which I got to this 
location. Perhaps, in order to see the event in a bittersweet hue, I already had to go 
through the 'sweet' and the 'bitter' phases.   
There is no correct understanding of the significance in the sense that there can be a 
correct understanding of the facts. Within my life, the only significance the events can 
have is the significance they do have for me. In saying this I quickly have to guard 
against four misunderstandings. First, even if the only relevant significance is the 
significance-for-me, this does not mean that such significance is subjective; I discover 
the significance, and cannot make events signify anything I want (although there is 
some room for giving or withholding the benefit of the doubt). Second, even if the only 
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relevant significance is the significance-for-me, this does not mean that I am impervious 
to persuasion by others, to accounts of conflicting significance offered to me by others, 
and to changes in the significance emerging from my own reflection on what happened. 
Third, although there is no absolutely objective significance, my understanding of the 
significance of the event is still partly constrained by the facts of what happened, by 
general rules of coherence and consistency with the rest of my memories; and by 
general rules of human behavior. Within such constraints, however, there will remain 
wide room for a shifting significance of the same event. Fourth and finally, it may seem 
that if the significance can shift, and there is no absolute significance, then the 
significance is arbitrary: that it doesn't really matter what the event signifies, since the 
significance might shift by the next year. This is misguided because it matters to the 
individual whose memories they are, and there is nothing arbitrary about the event as 
experienced in recollection. 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE LAST CHAPTER 
This business of shifting significance obviously goes on throughout one's life. But, what 
is distinctive about the last chapter in the story is that many such events can be re-
evaluated at once, such that the recollected significance of one event will affect the 
recollected significance of another as they come to fit into the big picture. It is worth 
stressing that such a big picture could be positive or negative in tone: I could recall an 
event and forgive my enemy, or I could send him back to hell with renewed vigor. There 
is no necessary reason why the deep awareness of one's own death should inspire 
humility and charity over smugness and Schadenfreude (malicious satisfaction received 
from the misfortune of others). 
Writing the last chapter therefore involves rewriting the chapters before it. This sounds 
dangerously like self-serving rationalizations to hide a guilty conscience, but it need not 
be. I will address this danger below. Instead, it can be compared to the healthy practice 
of a novelist revising the body of his book in the light of his knowledge of the whole, a 
knowledge he could only glean as he nears the end. The novelist may have a rough 
idea of the plot when he starts out, but inevitably things will turn out differently as a 
result of the sheer momentum of partly-independent characters and events. Then, he 
will go back and revise the earlier chapters to give a better structure to the whole. 
Similarly, the reader's experience of earlier chapters will be subtly altered by completing 
the book. In the crudest detective novels, for example, certain events or utterances, at 
the time apparently benign, will come to assume monstrous significance when the 
murderer's identity is revealed at the end, to which the typical response is "of course, I 
should have seen that."  
There is nothing more frustrating than getting absorbed in a book and then finding the 
final pages missing. The completion of the story has a much greater importance than 
merely confirming the reader's hope that the protagonists will live happily ever after. 
Instead, it gives a meaning to the whole story, making it greater than the sum of its 
parts. Similarly, if the final pages are intact, but the conclusion disappoints, we speak of 
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the end 'spoiling' the story. The text on the pages comprising the bulk of the book has 
not changed, of course, and still holds the same capacity to delight the reader reading it 
for the first time. But the ending spoils the whole, and affects the memories I retain of 
the book as an entirety. 
Perhaps this discussion is too metaphorical, so let me come back to a specific example 
of a dying person. Ronald Dworkin considers the subtle difference between a dying 
patient holding on until a particular event and holding on for that event. The former 
attitude is merely temporal, and involves enduring in one's struggle with deteriorating 
body. The latter attitude confirms "the critical importance of the values it identifies to the 
patient's sense of his own integrity, to the special character of his life." If I have always 
been attached to my family and to family events, for example, there will be a special 
urgency in being kept alive long enough to learn of the birth of a healthy grandchild. 
Conceiving of such an event as "salient for death," says Dworkin, confirms the 
importance of all such events in the person's life (Dworkin 1993 p. 212). Of course the 
person had experiences of family life that were enjoyed, appreciated and recollected in 
their own right. But it is this last wish which ties together all the individual experiences 
into a satisfying ending of the story of a particular person, a person partly defined by the 
long-standing value that his family played in his life. The longing to hear the news of the 
healthy grandchild naturally emerges from the recollection and reappraisal of all the 
events in the person's relationships with his family.  
THE RISK OF SELF-DECEPTION 
It could be objected that my account of the final chapter leaves too much room for self-
delusion. A classic example might be King Lear's mistaken confidence that his 
daughters Goneril and Regan loved him as much as they said they did. In Lear's case, 
his self-delusion certainly did exacerbate his tragedy. Similarly, if I choose to forgive my 
ex-wife as part of the composition of my final chapter, this could also be self-delusional 
in that it might not be my place at all to forgive her; instead, maybe it is I who should 
make special efforts to seek her out and beg her forgiveness. However accurate to the 
facts (I am assuming that both examples can plausible allow for these interpretations) 
and coherent my final story might be (the four qualifications I listed above), it could be 
resting on big lies at its core.  
I have three responses to this worry. The first involves a reiteration of my point about 
the absence of any absolute significance. When considering the possibility of self-
deception during the composition of the last chapter, it is important to remember that the 
past events are no longer directly accessible. Again, there may be facts of the matter to 
which any account will be answerable; but two people can find incompatible 
significances in a single fact without the implication that at least one of them is 
misremembering the fact. Such a conception of significance then means that any 
accusation of self-deception will be necessarily embodied; that is, made by one specific 
person to another specific person within a specific context. The accuser will compare 
his understanding of the fact with his understanding of the other's understanding of the 
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fact. Nothing in what I have said implies that the composition of the final chapter is 
impenetrable to challenge by relevantly knowledgeable others. The accuser may be 
able to explain to the accused why his account is self-deceiving; but there is no 
guarantee that such efforts will succeed, even when the accused is as open-minded 
and good-willed as the accuser could wish. 
Second, it is worth remembering that the intuitive badness of self-delusion is essentially 
forward-looking, as much as one's identification with the projects and commitments that 
give one's on-going life meaning. Within my own perspective on my life, I can be 
concerned for the truth because such concern will help me to avoid disappointment later 
on. If, however, there is to be no 'later on', then there will be no consequences of 
'getting it wrong' in the sense of which self-delusion is normally presented as a danger. 
Sometimes, during the composition of the last chapter, I may be genuinely unsure about 
the significance of an event; in which case I may have to 'plump' for a given 
interpretation and see it through: such plumping may be vulnerable to accusations of 
self-deception. (I borrow the term from Simon Blackburn (1996), who uses it in a 
different but not unrelated discussion.)  
Third and finally, there is an important sense in which I can say: so what if he is self-
deceiving himself in the composition of the last chapter? Indeed, for many people a 
certain amount of self-deception is surely essential to writing the final chapter with any 
degree of optimism that one's life has amounted to anything. After all, this is the result of 
all one's labors: this undignified decline of body and mind, the abandonment of family 
and the death of friends, and the sheer corrosive boredom and loneliness of long-term 
geriatric care. This would be bad enough in the middle of a life; it is appalling at the end 
of one. Self-deception in the sense that interests me is compatible with a clear-eyed 
effort to do justice to the people in one's past relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
The mere composition of a story, however, does not seem to provide the depth and 
richness and the importance that a person's life can have for that person. After all, in 
some contexts; a story is merely a story, a bloodless distraction from real life. Whereas, 
my focus has been very much on the real life in the importation of the term, 
eudaemonia. One advantage of this term over 'narrative', again, is that the latter can be 
applied essentially to any period in one's life. Eudaemonia is something that has to be 
achieved at the end of a life, when there is no further possibility for adversity that might 
undermine the holistic meaning of the life. The second advantage of the Greek concept 
is revealed by attending to the translation 'flourishing'. For in trying to achieve 
eudaemonia in the final stage of my life, I am not merely creating a coherent story for 
others, I am trying to flourish in the process of doing so. This requires more than the 
mere creation of the story; it also requires an intimate identification with the story, a 
blurring of the distinction between me and my story, and a final drive to live the story in 
full awareness of its partly-discovered and partly-assembled meaning. Above all, 
eudaemonia is about meaningfulness: what did this person's life mean? Who was he? 
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